mushtaq

Claude Salhani
UPI International Editor
June 21, 2007


WASHINGTON -- Turkey in recent years has shifted away from one of the basic tenets established by Mustafa Kemal, better known as Ataturk, the founder of the modern Turkish state, by becoming more and more involved in Middle Eastern politics.

"Turkey is now emerging as an important diplomatic actor in the Middle East," F. Stephen Larrabee, holder of the corporate chair in European security at the RAND Corp., writes in the July/August issue of Foreign Affairs.

Indeed, as Larrabee points out, "Ankara has established close ties with Iran and Syria," two countries with which relations had been strained during the past two decades. Additionally, the government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has adopted a more sympathetic view of the Palestinian issue, much to the detriment of Israel, with which Turkey had enjoyed more than cordial relations.

Geopolitical changes brought about by the end of the Cold War pushed Turkey to turn its attention eastwards. Larrabee explains that during the Cold War the main threat to Turkey's security "came almost exclusively from the Soviet Union." With the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War, the threats to Turkey's security shifted.

"Today, Turkey faces a much more diverse set of challenges," writes Larrabee, including Kurdish separatism; sectarian violence in Iraq; the rise of Iran and the Islamic republic's desire to become a nuclear power; and the fragmentation of Lebanon, partly at the hands of groups with close ties to Syria and Iran. Understandably, writes the author, Turkey has begun to focus more attention on the Middle East.

Turkey's newfound interest in its one-time dominions is not coincidental. It comes at a time when relations with the West have deteriorated as its ambitions to join the European Union are becoming more remote, particularly since the election of Nicolas Sarkozy to the French presidency. And relations with Washington have come under intense strain since the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. A poll conducted in 2006 by the German Marshall Fund found that "81 percent of Turks disapproved of President George W. Bush handling of international policies."

Larrabee explains that these new trends in Turkish politics were brought about by "important domestic changes in Turkish society," primarily by the replacement of the pro-Western elite that has shaped Turkish foreign policy since the end of World War II by a more conservative, more religious, and more nationalist elite that looks upon the West with suspicion.

The catalyst that propelled Turkey "more deeply into the vortex of Middle East politics" was the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Ankara was opposed to the idea of military intervention in Iraq from the very start; not out of sympathy for Saddam Hussein's regime, but more out of worry that the stability he provided on Turkey's southern border would disappear, giving the Kurds more leeway.

"Since the invasion, the Turkish leadership's worst fears have been realized," writes Larrabee. First, Iraq has turned into a "breeding ground for international terrorism." Second, Iran's influence in the region continues to grow. Third, and perhaps the most worrisome for Turkey, is the "drive for autonomy" of Iraq's Kurds, a trend that Ankara fears will encourage its own Kurdish population to aspire for independence.

One of the factors driving the Turkish/Syrian/Iranian rapprochement is their shared concern of the Kurdish question. None of the three governments wants to see the establishment of an independent Kurdish state out of fear that it would trigger nationalist sentiments within their own Kurdish populations.

But despite the newly found friendship between Ankara and Tehran, Turkey remains extremely worried by Iran's urge to acquire nuclear weapons. And should Iran achieve nuclear capability, Turkey would be forced to take countermeasures. According to Larrabee, Turkey would have three options.

First, Turkey could expand its missile defense cooperation with the United States and Israel. Second, it could enhance its military capabilities, including its medium-range missiles. Third, it could develop its own nuclear program - an option that Turkey would consider "only as a last resort" and if "its relations with the United States declined."

Turkey's relations with the United States have suffered as a result of Ankara's overtures to Damascus and Tehran, causing "concern in some quarters in Washington." The fear among some US officials is that Turkey's friendship with the Middle East would come about at the detriment of relations with the West.

However, that should not be the case. As Larrabee so adequately puts it, if managed properly, Turkey's flirtation with its neighbors to the east "could be an opportunity for Washington and its Western allies to use Turkey as a bridge to the Middle East."

Source: ME Times

rosehillgirl

Hi,

It isn't surprising that Turkey would turn toward it's Islamic neighbours. Members of the 'Christian Club' that is the EU are constantly making Turkey jump through more and more hoops. The constant threats of 'veto' from one member state or another do not encourage Turks to engage with Europe wholeheartedly.

Turkish Cypriots voted to end their isolation under the Annan Plan way back in 2004-yet still the isolationist restrictions are in force despite endless promises from the EU. The EU allows itself to be held to ransom by the goverment of half of a very small island.

As far as 81% of Turks disapproved of Bush's foreign policies-I believe the figures would not be hugely different in the UK.

None of the report is very surprising-except to the US government, who can't believe not everyone wants to jump into bed with them or with Europe.

Ann